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Irrationality or Efficiency of Macroeconomic Survey Forecasts? 




We analyze the quality of macroeconomic survey forecasts. Recent findings indicate that they 
are  anchoring  biased.  This  irrationality  would  challenge  the  results  of  a  wide  range  of 
empirical studies, e.g., in asset pricing, volatility clustering or market liquidity, which rely on 
survey  data  to  capture  market  participants’  expectations.  We  contribute  to  the  existing 
literature in two ways. First, we show that the cognitive bias is a statistical artifact. Despite 
highly  significant  anchoring  coefficients  a  bias  adjustment  does  not  improve  forecasts’ 
quality.  To  explain  this  counterintuitive  result  we  take  a  closer  look  at  macroeconomic 
analysts’ information processing abilities. We find that analysts benefit from the use of an 
extensive  information  set,  neglected  in  the  anchoring  bias  test.  Exactly  this  information 
advantage drives the misleading anchoring bias test results. Second, we find that the superior 
information aggregation capabilities enable analysts to easily outperform sophisticated time-
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A large and growing body of financial market research relies on survey forecasts to isolate the 
unanticipated  information  component  in  scheduled  macroeconomic  releases.
1  Recently, 
Campbell and Sharpe (2009) suggest that there is a substantial “anchoring bias” in analysts’ 
forecasts.  This  implies  that  analysts’  forecasts  would  not  adequately  approximate  market 
participants’ expectations since they could be substantially improved. However, we cannot 
find that macroeconomic analysts’ forecasts can be improved – once we apply a look-ahead 
bias  free  test  and  adjustment  procedure.  In  contrast,  while  anchoring  would  suggest  that 
analysts’  forecasts  underperform  mechanical  time-series  models,  we  find  the  opposite: 
macroeconomic analysts substantially outperform mechanical forecasts. This outperformance 
can  be  attributed  to  the  fact  that  analysts  use  a  much  richer  information  set,  i.e.  they 
incorporate other information besides the historical time-series the anchoring test focuses on. 
While analysts’ forecasts deviate from time-series forecast, we find that by deviating analysts 
reduce – not increase – forecasts errors. Moreover, we show that these deviations can be 
explained largely by other macroeconomic data. More generally, our analysis points out a 
universal risk inherent in (behavioral) tests focusing on a single time-series property: rational 
agents’  forecasts  may  deviates  from  time-series  forecasts  not  only  because  of  cognitive 
inefficiencies but also because of using a richer information set. 
Compared to the extensive research that has been conducted in the area of macroeconomic 
information processing in financial markets (e.g. Urich and Wachtel (1984), McQueen and 
Roley (1993), Balduzzi et al. (2001) and Andersen et al.(2003)) comparatively little analysis 
is available concerning the properties of macroeconomic survey forecasts.  This is somewhat 
surprising, but possibly due to the high quality of survey forecasts. The few thus far available 
                                                 
1  For  example,  studies  on  market  efficiency,  information  processing,  liquidity  around  announcements,  or 
volatility  clustering  use  macroeconomic  survey  forecasts.  Most  frequently,  Money  Market  Services  (MMS) 
survey data are used, for example, by Urich and Wachtel (1984), McQueen and Roley (1993), Almeida et al. 
(1998), Elton (1999), Balduzzi et al. (2001), Flannery and Protopapadakis (2002), Andersen et al. (2003), Green 
(2004), Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Hautsch and Hess (2007), Evans and Lyons (2008), and Hautsch et al. 
(2010), to cite only a few. 3 
 
forecast rationality studies largely test  for  general quality properties derived from Muth’s 
Rational Expectations Hypothesis (1961)
2. As a common outcome, general forecast rationality 
studies provide no evidence of systematic and persistent inefficiencies.
3 In contrast, Campbell 
and  Sharpe  (2009)  test  for  a  specific  behavioral  inefficiency,  the  anchoring  bias,  first 
documented  by  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1974)  in  psychological  experiments.  Anchoring 
implies that too much weight is attached to a certain prior available piece of information. In 
the context of macroeconomic forecasts it would mean that the surveyed analyst puts too 
much  importance  on  the  last  months’  actual  and  therefore  underweights  other  important 
information.  Thus  the  entire  information  set  available  at  the  survey  date  would  not  be 
efficiently  incorporated  in  the  forecast  generation  process.  But  then,  utilizing  the  entire 
available information correctly must yield improved forecasts. Only if this is the case, the 
widely used survey forecasts would have to be viewed as inefficient and poor proxies of 
market participant’s expectations. 
However, we cannot reach this conclusion. In contrast, our analysis reveals a counter-intuitive 
result:  Despite  a  seemingly  strong  and  statistically  significant  anchoring  bias  in  most 
macroeconomic survey series, adjusting forecasts for the seemingly apparent bias leads to no 
systematic forecast improvements. Decomposing the anchoring bias test statistic provides an 
explanation for this puzzling result: the test itself is biased. Testing solely against univariate 
time  series  information  the  anchoring  bias  test  neglects  the  possibility  that  analysts  may 
provide superior forecasts by using a richer information set than just the univariate time series 
itself.  Our  empirical  results  support  this  explanation,  revealing  for  a  broad  range  of 
macroeconomic  series  that  efficiency  –  rather  than  inefficiency  –  is  producing  the  large 
“anchoring  bias”  coefficients.  By  arranging  a  “horse  race”  between  survey  and  model 
                                                 
2 See e.g. Pesando (1975), and Mullineaux (1978) Pearce and Roley (1985), Aggarwal et al. (1995), and Schirm 
(2003). 
3 The most recent study, Schirm (2003), finds only for small number of investigated series some bias. However 
his results partly contradict the findings of Aggarwal et al. (1995) obtained on a different sample.  4 
 
forecasts  we  document  that  analysts’  forecasts  aggregate  more  valuable  information  than 
contained  in  the  historical  time  series  and  are  therefore  quite  efficient.  This  forecast 
comparison  is  a  distinctive  contribution  to  the  existing  forecast  quality  literature.  While 
previous studies assumed efficiency, we are the first to hypothesize inefficiency. Rejecting 
this hypothesis provides evidence in favor of efficient information processing by analysts. 
Our more general approach allows us to address the more interesting question whether analyst 
forecasts represent the best available information aggregate instead of testing whether one 
single piece of information was incorrectly incorporated. 
Our analysis proceeds in five steps. First we replicate the anchoring bias test of Campbell and 
Sharpe (2009). However, we use a much broader set of macroeconomic indicators, allowing 
for a more comprehensive analysis.  More importantly, we use a much longer sample period 
to facilitate out-of-sample tests. This “dynamic” analysis, i.e. testing on a rolling-window and 
correspondingly  adjusting  forecasts  out-of-sample,  enables  us  to  build  on  the  exact 
information flow, i.e. to consider only information available to market participants at a given 
point in time. Hence, our procedure avoids a look-ahead bias. This is of particular importance 
when  we  adjust  the  data  for  the  anchoring  bias,  because  only  this  real-time  proceeding 
ensures a realistic comparison of unadjusted and adjusted data. In contrast, Campbell and 
Sharpe’s analysis (which we call “static”) is based on a single in-sample regression and a 
corresponding adjustment would incorporate a potentially severe look-ahead bias.  
If  the  highly  significant  anchoring  coefficients  would  stem  from  a  cognitive  bias,  then 
adjusting  the  original  survey  forecasts  must  yield  substantial  improvements  in  forecast 
quality. Surprisingly, despite highly significant anchoring coefficients we can hardly find any 
significant improvements in forecast quality when adjusting for this seemingly apparent bias. 
Only when we allow for a look-ahead bias, i.e. for the statical estimation and adjustment, we 
find some modest improvements. More importantly and even more disturbingly, we can find 5 
 
virtually  no  improvements  of  forecast  quality  for  the  dynamically  estimated  anchoring 
coefficients,  which  avoid  a  look-ahead  bias.  Only  for  2  out  of  23  series  we  can  find 
statistically significant improvements, but for another 2 series forecast quality significantly 
worsens  through  the  adjustment.  Overall,  we  have  to  conclude  that  nothing  is  gained  by 
adjusting forecasts, despite highly significant anchoring test coefficients.  
In  order  to  explain  this  puzzling  result  we  inspect  in  a  third  step  the  mechanics  of  the 
anchoring bias test. Most importantly, the anchoring bias test implicitly assumes a univariate 
time series framework. This creates a substantial problem since it neglects other information 
which most likely alters rational forecasts. In particular, we show that the overall test statistic 
can be decomposed into two components: The first component captures inefficient processing 
of  univariate  time  series  information,  possibly  due  to  anchoring.  The  second  component, 
however, captures superior information processing abilities of analysts, supposedly due to 
using a richer information set. Hence, large and significant anchoring coefficients can not 
only  arise  when  analysts  face  a  cognitive  bias  but  also  when  they  correctly  incorporate 
additional information in their predictions and therefore outperform time series forecasts. This 
suggests that neglecting other information may be responsible for the misleading anchoring 
bias test results.  In fact, in line with previous research on the properties of stock market 
analysts’ forecasts,
4 we find that macroeconomic survey forecasts substantially outperform 
optimized time series forecasts. Overall, this analysis shows that the anchoring bias test is 
biased  itself.  Large  coefficients  could  be  just  due  to  efficient  –  rather  than  inefficient  – 
information processing.  
Outperforming optimal univariate time-series forecasts implies that analysts have to use some 
additional information while generating their forecast. In fact, in a fourth step, we provide 
                                                 
4 For example, it has long been argued that financial analysts provide more accurate earnings forecasts than 
univariate time series models because analysts use a broader information set than just the univariate time series 
of historical earnings. For earnings forecasts this enlarged information set  presumably includes, among other 
things, macroeconomic information. See, e.g., Brown (1993) and Brown et. al. (1997). 6 
 
evidence supporting the view that macroeconomic analysts use a much broader information 
set than just the univariate time series. In particular, we find that a substantial part of the 
forecast improvement analysts achieve over time series models can be explained by other 
macroeconomic data. This result suggests that analysts draw on several other macroeconomic 
indicators. We find that in particular those macroeconomic figures that are identified to be the 
most “important” ones by Gilbert et. al. (2010), i.e. those with substantial information content 
and those being released early in the monthly release cycle seem to contribute. Consequently, 
analysts seem to be rather efficient information processors pooling a large amount of valuable 
information.      
Fifth,  we  quantify  the  relative  contributions  of  the  “inefficiency”  and  the  “additional 
information” component to the overall anchoring bias test coefficient. Our results suggest that 
for  the  majority  of  significantly  biased  forecast  series,  the  “additional  information” 
component accounts for more than half of the overall anchoring bias coefficients’ size. This 
explains the puzzling result that almost all survey forecasts seem to be severely anchoring 
biased while an adjustment does not lead to improvements.  
Overall, our analysis yields an astonishing result. Rather than detecting inefficiencies in U.S. 
macroeconomic survey forecasts we find strong evidence for superior information processing 
abilities  of  analysts.  The  highly  significant  anchoring  bias  test  results  are  not  due  to  a 
cognitive bias of analysts, but result from their superiority compared to time series models. 
For every single macroeconomic series analysts easily outperform the out-of-sample forecasts 
of dynamically optimized time series models. This strongly indicates that survey forecasts 
aggregate additional information beyond the univariate time series data, in particular, other 
currently  released  macroeconomic  figures.  Obviously,  it  is  extremely  difficult  if  not 
impossible to adequately model the entire available information set and to come up with a 
better forecasting model. Therefore, we have to conclude that survey forecasts are still the 7 
 
best  available  approximation  of  market  participants’  expectations.  Moreover,  our  analysis 
shows that testing for a specific bias such as anchoring by exclusively focusing on univariate 
time  series  properties  is  dangerous  since  it  neglects  the  ability  of  analysts  to  aggregate 
additional information. Overall, our findings suggest that anchoring does not constitute any 
problem for earlier information processing studies building on survey forecasts. 
With this study we contribute to different strands of literature. Our results directly add to the 
scarce  literature  analyzing  possible  biases  in  macroeconomic  forecasts  by  showing  that 
analysts’  forecasts  are  the  most  comprehensive  and  efficient  information  aggregates. 
Consequently  they  best  represent  market  participants’  expectations  regarding  upcoming 
macroeconomic  releases.  Moreover,  our  findings  have  important  implications  for  a  broad 
range of studies relying on macroeconomic survey forecasts in order to extract unanticipated 
information components in scheduled releases (e.g. Andersen et al. (2003), Green (2004), 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), Hautsch and Hess (2007), Evans and Lyons (2008) to name just 
a  few).  Furthermore,  since  the  anchoring  bias  adjusted  forecast  is  basically  a  weighted 
combination of the survey forecast and an autoregressive model we contribute to the area of 
forecast  combination  in  which  currently  no  results  concerning  monthly  macroeconomic 
survey forecasts are available. 
The remainder of the study is organized as follows. In section 1 we briefly delineate the 
anchoring bias test and introduce our framework for the evaluation of analysts’ forecasts. 
Section 2 describes the data and their properties. Section 3 provides the empirical results and 
section 4 concludes. 
 8 
 
I.  Methodology 
The basic assumption of the anchoring bias test
5 is that the MMS survey forecast ( ) t F  is a 
linear  combination  of  an  unbiased  forecast  for  the  next  month’s  actual,  t E A     ,  and  an 
average of already released values for the h  previous months: 
  ( ) 1 . t t h F E A A λ λ   = ⋅ + − ⋅     (1) 
The unbiased estimator for next month’s actual already incorporates all available information 
efficiently. The inclusion of additional past information is redundant and therefore λ should 
be one. A value of λ significantly smaller than one would suggests anchoring, i.e. putting too 
much weight on previously released values in comparison to an unbiased estimator.  
Since  the  unbiased  estimator  is  unobservable  a  direct  estimation  of  equation  (1)  is  not 
feasible. It can be shown that an indirect estimation of  λ is possible by means of (2) (see 
Appendix A for a derivation):   
  ( ) ( ) 1





= ⋅ − + ≡   (2) 
where  t S denotes the unanticipated news component defined as actual minus forecast
6. On the 
one  hand,  0 γ > would  indicate  anchoring,  i.e.  1 λ < .  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  no 
economically plausible explanation for 0, γ <  i.e.  1 λ > . Nevertheless, significant negative 
coefficients  imply  partly  predictable  surprises.  Following,  we  might  be  able  to  improve 
forecast quality even in cases in which the anchoring bias test leads to results contradicting its 
purpose.  
                                                 
5 Campbell and Sharpe (2009) 
6 Although equation (2) does not include a constant we always include one in the estimation. 9 
 
Equation (1) suggests that the unbiased estimate  t E A      is compounded of the survey based 
forecast and the anchor: 
  ( ) ( )
1
1 t
t t h h
F





  = − ⋅ = + ⋅ − ⋅   .  (3) 
Equation (3) in connection with γ  estimated on the basis of (2), the original forecast data can 
be adjusted for the anchoring induced bias. These adjusted forecasts serve as central input 
variables for our forecast quality comparison tests to determine the economical significance of 
the anchoring bias. We perform two different adjustments. First, to evaluate the in-sample 
impact of the anchoring bias we estimate (2) over the entire sample period and adjust the 
forecasts retrospectively. Additionally, to avoid an in-sample look-ahead bias, we perform a 
dynamic adjustment by means of a rolling estimation of (2). Given the current coefficient we 
adjust the next forecast in a way market participants would have been able to adjust the data. 
Since this approach represents an implementable strategy it has to be taken as the real test of 
the anchoring bias’ impact. 
To analyze the implicit time series framework underlying the anchoring bias test we assume 
that  t A   follows  some  ARMA(p,q)  process,  a  fairly  general  representation.  Moreover  we 
suppose that analysts use a corresponding ARMA(p,q) model to generate forecasts. However, 
we  believe  that  analysts  do  not  restrict  themselves  to  looking  at  historical  time-series 
information. Instead we suppose that they possess some additional information  t Z  useful to 
predict the innovation  t e
 
in  t A , e.g., from inspecting other macroeconomic announcements or 
simply from reading the daily press. Based on these considerations we show that γ  in (2) can 
be written as (see Appendix B) 10 
 
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
' ' ' '
1 1 1 1
' '
1 1
, , , ,
ˆ .
2 ,
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
Cov e x Cov y x Cov Z x Cov e Z Var Z
Var x Var Z Cov Z x
γ
− − − −
− −
+ − + −
=
+ + ⋅
  (4) 
To  separate  the  part  of  γ   driven  by  the  additional  information  set  measured  by  t Z we 
decompose γ ɵ  into two parts 
  ( ) ( )








t t t t
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and 
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1 ˆ 0 γ =
 
if  ( )
' '
1 1 , t t Cov y x − − =  0,  i.e.,  if  analysts’  estimates  ˆ
j β   are  unbiased  ( ˆ
j β = j j β ∀  
implying in this case  '
1 0 t y − = ) and if, at the same time,  ( )
'
1 , 0 t t Cov e x − = . Since  '
1 t x −  
contains exclusively time series information up to time t-1 it should not contain predictive 
power to explain the innovation. If  '
1 t x −  would allow to predict the innovation  t e , then “old” 
time series information would yield a more precise forecast than the survey forecast. In this 
case analysts’ forecast (or the models they use) would be inefficient. Therefore,  1 ˆ γ  captures 
inefficiencies in analysts’ forecasts.  11 
 
Since  '
1 t x − only consists of past innovations of the actual generating process it should at best 
be  weakly  correlated  with t Z .  Furthermore,  if  analysts  have  superior  forecasting  abilities 
compared to the optimal time series model the correlation between  t Z  and  t e  should be 
positive.  Consequently,  if  ( ) ( ) ( )
'
1 , , t t t t t Cov e Z Var Z Cov Z x − > +   this  suggests  that  a 
positive part of the anchoring coefficient  γ  is driven by the additional information amount 
used by the surveyed analysts.  
Since additional information,  t Z , is not directly observable we have to use a proxy measure. 
The basic idea is to generate an optimal univariate time-series forecast to extract  t Z  as the 
residual from the MMS survey forecast. First, we estimate an “optimal” ARIMA model for 
the actual. We select the optimal order of differencing d according to a Phillips-Perron test. 
Then we estimate the model for all combinations of p = 0, …, 6 and q = 0, 1. We chose the 
best  fitting  model  according  to  Bayes’  information  criterion  (BIC)  among  those  models 
providing residuals that are not serially correlated. Based on this selection procedure, we 
obtain an “optimal” time series model to describe the actual. The generated residuals of this 
model serve as proxy measure for the innovation of the actual generating process ( t ε ), i.e., the 
component in  t A  which is not predictable from historical univariate time series information.  
Now we analyze survey forecasts  t F , applying a distributed lag model corresponding to the 
optimal ARIMA specification of actual, i.e. we regress the (differenced) forecasts  t F  on p 
lags of  t A  and q lags of ˆ t e . The residuals of this estimation serves as approximations for  t Z , 
i.e., the component in survey forecasts  t F  which  cannot be traced back to past observed 
actuals. 12 
 
To rule out the possibility that our proxy for the additional information,  t Z ,  just picks up 
noise and to answer the question where analysts’ outperformance comes from we analyze 
how  t Z  is related to information available at the time when analysts produce their forecasts. 
For this purpose we estimate the following model: 
  , t t t Z M α β ϕ = + +   (7) 
where  t Z  denotes the approximated additional information component in survey forecasts and 
t M a vector containing the available macroeconomic information set for the 23 considered 
indicators seven days prior to an announcement. Using a stepwise regression approach allows 
us to determine whether  t Z  is an inappropriate proxy for additional information or whether it 
is related to other macroeconomic news. 
Finally we quantify the contribution of the “additional information” and the “inefficiency” 
component to the overall anchoring bias coefficient. Based on our theoretical considerations 
including equation (5) and (6) a partition is feasible and we can conclude whether irrationality 
or information efficiency drives the anchoring bias test results.     
II.  Data Description  
We  use  a  comprehensive  data  set  comprising  23  well  known  macroeconomic  indicators. 
Table  1  lists  the  series  along  with  the  abbreviations  used  in  the  following  sections,  their 
availability during the sample periods and the respective reporting unit. Medians of analysts’ 
forecasts for these macroeconomic data are obtained from MMS and Action Economists
7. As 
                                                 
7 Each Friday, MMS polls analysts’ forecasts of macroeconomic figures to be released during the following 
week. Survey responses are received over a three- to four-hour period every Friday morning via fax or phone. 
The results of the survey are published at around 1:30  PM EST. In September 2003 MMS was acquired by 
Informa. However, the original MMS survey was conducted until mid of December 2003. For the time after 
December  2003  we  use  forecasts  provided  by  Action  Economics  (AE).  Although  AE  is  not  MMS’  legal 13 
 
a robustness check we use Bloomberg and Reuters forecasts. Since the results are virtually 
identical  we  do  not  report  them.  Whenever  available,  we  use  ALFRED  vintage  data  to 
measure  actual  announced  values.
8  Otherwise  announced  values  provided  by  the  survey 
agencies are used.  
Table  2  shows  sample  means  ( )     and  standard  deviations  ( ) σ   for  the  23  considered 
indicators (actuals, forecasts, and surprises). Sample means of the surprises are close to zero 
for most indicators implying that the forecasts are unbiased if not conditioned on a specific 
information set. Moreover, except for a few series (in particular, HE) the standard deviations 
of surprises are substantially smaller than the standard deviations of actual implying positive 
correlations of the actual and the forecast.
9  
III.  Empirical Results 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we perform both in- and out-of-sample 
anchoring tests for a broad range of macroeconomic series. Given the  bias estimates, we 
analyze in a second step whether analysts’ forecasts can be improved  by adjustments for 
anchoring.  Then in a third step, we evaluate the analysts’ forecasting abilities in comparison 
to  optimally  selected  univariate  time  series  models.  Furthermore,  to  explain  analysts’ 
outperformance  we  analyze  which  additional  information  are  processed  in  their  forecasts. 
Finally,  we  decompose  the  estimated  anchoring  coefficients  ˆ γ   into  an  “inefficiency” 
component  1 ˆ γ   and  an  “additional  information”  component  2 ˆ γ   and  evaluate  their  relative 
contributions to determine the factor driving the anchoring bias test results.  
                                                                                                                                                          
successor in terms of content it is, because most of the former MMS employees responsible for the survey 
founded AE after the takeover. In the following we always name the median forecast time series MMS forecasts, 
although it is continued with AE forecasts.  
8 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis provides excess to a broad set of US macroeconomic data in their online 
database called ArchivaL Federal Reserve Economic Data.  
9 The correlation between   and  t t A F is positive if  t t t V S V A V F       < +       . 14 
 
a.  Anchoring tests results 
We start with a “static” or in-sample test design and estimate equation (2) on the full sample 
for three different specifications of  h , where  1 h =  corresponds to anchoring on the last 
month’s  actual  only  and    2 h =   or  3  to  anchoring  on  the  mean  of  the  two  or  three 
previously announced actual values, respectively. Since the static test involves a serious look-
ahead-bias we perform a “dynamic” analysis in addition, estimating the anchoring coefficients 
on a rolling window with a fixed length of 10 years.  
Table 3 reports results for the static as well as for the dynamic test. Regarding the static tests, 
we report the optimal h , i.e. which regression specification performed best according to the 
Bayes’ information criterion (BIC), along with the corresponding anchoring bias coefficient 
ˆ γ . These results suggest that in about two thirds of the cases analyst use an average and not a 
single value as anchor. According to the test results survey forecasts for 18 out of the 23 
macroeconomic series are significantly biased. However, for two of these series we obtain 
significantly negative coefficients which could hardly be explained by anchoring. Moreover, 
the large variation in the estimated coefficients suggests substantially different degrees of 
anchoring. For factory orders (FO), for example, this would imply that analysts put about 4% 
weight  on  last  month’s  release  and  about  96%  on  the  expected  value,  i.e.,  the  unbiased 
forecast. In contrast, for consumer confidence (CC) it seems that the unbiased estimator and 
the previously released actual enter the MMS forecast with approximately equal weights. 
Results of the dynamic anchoring tests are given in Table 3 as well. For simplicity we only 
report the most frequently observed optimal h  along with means and the standard deviations 
of the  ˆ γ s estimated on rolling windows of 10 years length. For most macroeconomic series 
the mean dynamic  ˆ γ  are largely comparable to their static  ˆ γ  counterparts, in particular, for 
the series which exhibit a significant static  ˆ γ . Surprisingly, the standard deviations of the 15 
 
dynamic γ  estimates are rather large and indicate a substantial variation over the sample. For 
example, for CC we obtain a mean of 0.922 and a standard deviation of 0.365, stemming from 
a  range  of  dynamic  ˆ γ s  (not  reported)  of  -0.306  to  1.434.  In  fact,  many  series  exhibit  a 
substantial time variation in the  ˆ γ  coefficients.  
Although the dynamic test results appear to be slightly weaker overall they are akin to the 
static test outcomes. For both static and dynamic we get sizable  ˆ γ  coefficients for most of the 
macroeconomic forecast series indicating substantial anchoring. At first sight this suggests 
partly predictable surprises and portends a poor quality of the frequently used MMS forecasts.  
Consequently this questions their appropriateness as proxy measures for market participants’ 
expectations. 
b. Can anchoring adjustments improve analysts’ forecasts? 
Given the highly significant and sizable anchoring coefficients we would expect that analysts’ 
forecast can be substantially improved by adjusting them according to equation (3). Results 
are given in Table 4. First, we compute in-sample adjustments applying the estimated static 
γ   coefficients.  Then,  to  evaluate  the  real  economical  impact,  we  apply  dynamic  γ  
coefficients. To adjust the forecast for period t we use the dynamic  γ  coefficients estimated 
on information up to time t-1. In contrast to the static adjustments, this avoids a look-ahead 
bias. For both static and dynamic adjustments we report the change in root mean squared 
forecast errors (  RMSFE) resulting from these adjustments. Negative values indicate that the 
RMSFE  of  the  adjusted  MMS  forecast  is  smaller  than  the  unadjusted  one,  i.e.  that  the 
anchoring  bias  adjustment  improves  forecasts.  To  test  whether  these  improvements  are 
significant, we run Diebold and Mariano (1995) tests on differences in mean squared errors 16 
 
(MSE).
  10  Since  macroeconomic  analysts,  in  contrast  to  stock  market  analysts,  have  no 
incentives  to  issue  systematic  overoptimistic  or  pessimistic  forecasts  the  assumption  of  a 
quadratic loss function implied by the MSE is uncritical.  
By construction, the static (or in-sample) adjustments cannot yield a larger RMSFE of the 
adjusted series. Nevertheless, the improvements are rather small. We observe a reduction of 
8.38%  at  best.  Moreover,  the  Diebold  Mariano  tests  find  that  only  about  60%  of  the 
significantly biased forecast series can be improved. This is somewhat surprising since the 
static anchoring tests make use of forward looking information. Naturally, one would expect 
significant forecast changes whenever we get a significant anchoring test coefficient, at least 
for the static case.  
The results of dynamic adjustments are much worse. When we adjust forecasts dynamically, 
i.e. without using forward looking information, almost no improvements can be obtained. 
There are only two exceptions, CC and DGO for which we obtain significantly improved 
forecasts according to the Diebold-Mariano test on differences in MSE. These correspond to a 
reduction in RMSFEs of nearly 8% for CC and less than 6% for DGO. On the other hand, we 
observe also two cases with significantly worsening forecast errors, i.e. NF and TRD. For all 
other  series,  changes  in  forecast  errors  are  insignificant  though  large  in  some  cases.  For 
example, we observe the largest though insignificant forecast error change for RS, worsening 
the series’ RMSFE by around 15%. Since the dynamical adjustment best represents market 
participants’ approach to correct for the cognitive bias our results provide strong evidence 
against the economical significance of the anchoring bias. 
Moreover, note that the size of the anchoring  coefficient is at best loosely  related to the 
improvements. For instance the durable goods orders bias coefficient is 0.398 and results in 
                                                 
10 The test we apply includes the small sample adjustment of Harvey, Leybourne and Newbold (1997).  17 
 
an RMFSE improvement of about 4.6%. In contrast the personal consumption expenditures 
anchoring bias coefficient is only 0.189 and leads to a considerable larger RMFSE reduction 
of about 7%. This odd pattern provides evidence that the anchoring bias test results might be 
misleading, i.e., a sizable  ˆ γ  does not necessarily lead to large forecast improvements.  
c.  Incremental forecast improvement over time series models 
Our  theoretical  analysis  provides  a  possible  –  though  disturbing  –  explanation  for  the 
disconnection of forecast improvements and  ˆ γ -coefficients. Equation (6) suggests that we 
may find a significant anchoring bias simply because analysts provide sophisticated forecasts 
by incorporating additional information beyond the univariate time-series information. This is 
definitely not unreasonable. For example, just by reading the current newspapers, analysts can 
process other contemporaneous business news. Technically speaking, γ -coefficients may just 
reflect that analysts can forecast part of the innovation in the data generating process, i.e. part 
of  the  change  from  the  last  month’s  actual  unpredictable  with  univariate  time-series 
information, by drawing on a richer information set. This would imply that survey forecasts 
are quite efficient – not inefficient as indicated by the anchoring bias test results.   
To analyze this issue, we compare analysts’ median forecasts  t F  for a given month t with an 
“optimal” univariate time series forecast  TS
t F . To obtain an optimal forecast series without a 
look-ahead  bias,  we  estimate  various  time  series  models  using  a  rolling  window.  More 
precisely, for each point in time  1 t −  we estimate a broad range of different ARIMA(p,d,q) 
specifications (i.e. all combinations of p = 1, …,6, d = 0,1, and q = 0,1) using the last 10 years 
of data. Out of these we select the best fitting model according to the BIC. The estimated 
coefficients of this best fitting model are then used to produce a one-period-ahead time-series 
forecast  TS
t F  for period  t . Then we shift the estimation window by one observation and 18 
 
repeat the procedure to obtain a forecast for the next period. Concatenating these one-step-
ahead forecasts, we obtain a time series of optimal forecasts.  
Summary statistics for this optimal forecasts series are given in Table 5. The first column 
reports the parameters p, d, q for the most frequently best fitting ARIMA model. For example, 
for CC a specification with p=1, d=0 and q=0, i.e. a simple AR(1) model, turns out to provide 
the best fit in most cases. An even simpler model emerges for  ISM: the most frequently 
optimal specification is p=0, d=1 and q=0, i.e. a model in first differences including solely a 
constant term. Thus for ISM the most frequently optimal model is a random walk with drift. 
Similarly for the majority of the other series the optimal model is rather simple. In most cases 
we find an AR(1), MA(1), or ARMA(1,1) processes (after first differencing) to be optimal. 
Only a few series call for second or third order processes.  
Note that our time series of one-step-ahead forecasts  TS
t F  estimated on a rolling window 
exploits the historical time series information available at any point in time most efficiently, 
but at the same time, avoids a look-ahead bias. In this sense it provides a benchmark for 
analysts’  forecasts.  Anchoring  is  equivalent  to  overestimating  the  influence  of  past 
observations,  e.g.  using  a  larger  than  optimal  first-order  autoregressive  parameter  when 
applying an AR(1) model. Hence, if analysts produce forecasts that are more or less strongly 
anchoring biased we would expect that an efficiently estimated time series model (avoiding 
this bias) outperforms analysts’ forecasts. However, this only holds if the underperformance 
induced by the anchoring bias outweighs the overperformance resulting from the use of a 
broader information set. 
This is definitely not the case. Columns 2 and 3 of Table 5 provide a comparison of forecast 
errors (RMSFE) of our out-of-sample time series forecasts and analysts’ predictions. Column 
5  reports  the  relative  difference.  For  every  single  macroeconomic  series  the  RMSFE  of 19 
 
analysts’  forecasts  is  smaller,  for  most  series  by  more  than  20%  implying  economically 
significant  better  forecasts.  To  evaluate  the  statistical  significance  of  these  forecast 
improvements, we use again a Diebold-Mariano test with small sample adjustment. For 20 out 
of  the  23  series  we  find  significant  differences  in  MSE.  For  the  vast  majority  of 
macroeconomic series analysts’ forecasts significantly outperform the time series forecasts.  
For the remaining three series, i.e. core PPI, HS, and CS, analysts’ forecasts have a smaller 
error as well, though the differences are statistically insignificant. 
Overall,  for  none  of  the  macroeconomic  series  our  sophisticated  time-series  models 
outperform  analysts’  forecasts.  Hence,  in  line  with  previous  research  on  stock  analysts’ 
forecast performance (see e.g. Brown et al. (1987)), our estimation results clearly show that 
analysts provide superior forecasts in comparison to optimally selected univariate time series 
models.  
Outperforming a model which optimally exploits univariate time series information can only 
stem  from  using  a  richer  information  set.  To  extract  the  forecast  component  which  is 
unrelated to historical announcements (i.e.,  t Z ) we use the procedure described in section 1. 
Based on a distributed lag model, we decompose  t F  into a component explained by historical 
time series information and a residual  ˆ
t Z . Now, this residual could just represent noise picked 
up by analysts when producing their forecasts. In this case  ˆ
t Z  would not help to predict  t A , or 
more precisely, would be uncorrelated with our estimate of the innovation in  t A , i.e., ˆ t e . 
Correlations of  ˆ
t Z  and  ˆ t e  are reported in Table 6. Most importantly, we find solely positive 
and highly significant correlations of  ˆ
t Z  and ˆ t e . This strongly suggests that  ˆ
t Z  represents not 
just  noise  being  picked  up  somehow  by  analysts.  In  contrast,  the  additional  information 
component  in  analysts’  forecasts  is  able  to  predict  some  part  of  the  innovation  in 20 
 
announcements. Since our approximated innovation ˆ t e  constitutes the unpredictable part in an 
announcement  after  employing  optimally  univariate  time-series  information,  the  high 
correlation of  ˆ
t Z  and  ˆ t e  also suggests that analysts’ superior forecasting abilities stem from 
the incorporation of valuable additional information. Again, this finding is in line with studies 
analyzing  stock  analysts’  forecast  performance.  For  instance  Fried  and  Givoly  (1982) 
document  that  stock  analysts’  outperformance  over  time-series  models  is  based  on 
autonomous, i.e. additional information.   
One potential source of valuable additional information are other macroeconomic news. Due 
to interrelations between macroeconomic indicators it is quite plausible that analysts utilize 
these  releases  in  their  forecast  generation  process.  Therefore,  other  macroeconomic  news 
should be able to, at least partly, explain the additional information approximated by  ˆ
t Z . 
Especially indicators  released  early in the cycle and those with large information content 
about the state of the economy should be useful (Gilbert et. al. 2010). As described in Section 
I  we  regress  ˆ
t Z   on  all  macroeconomic  information  available  seven  days  prior  to  the 
announcements  using  a  stepwise  regression  approach  to  identify  the  most  influential 
indicators. Table 7 shows the regression results for selected indicators. Table 8 provides an 
overview for all indicators showing how many other indicators contribute to the explanation 
of  ˆ
t Z   in column (1). Column (2) reports the associated R
2 and the last column shows how 
often  the  indicator  is  useful  to  explain  t Z   of  other  macroeconomic  series.  Consumer 
Confidence  for  instance  helps  to  explain  t Z   of  10  other  macroeconomic  series,  i.e.  is 
contained  in  the  best  model  for  10  indicators.  The  results  provide  strong  evidence  that 
additional macroeconomic information can partly explain analysts’ outperformance compared 
to optimized univariate time-series models. Depending on the indicator, between 7.0% (CPI) 21 
 
and almost 81% (PCE) of the variation in  ˆ
t Z  can be explained by other  macroeconomic 
information. On average, R-squares amount to 36%. Furthermore, column (3) reveals that the 
most  influential  indicators  are  those  which  are  released  relatively  early  and  which  are 
commonly viewed to be good indicators of current or future economic activity. Consequently, 
we find ISM, CC, RS, NFP and UN to be the most important components of the additional 
macroeconomic information set. ISM for instance contributes in 14 out of 23 cases to the 
explanation of  ˆ
t Z . 
Moreover, our results indicate that analyst process even more information beyond a broad set 
of macroeconomic news, probably including data which are not easily accessible via regular 
databases  This  suggests  that  their  contribution  as  information  intermediaries  is  valuable. 
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that analysts’ forecasts may still contain some behavioral 
bias. At least, our results suggest that the advantage of using a richer information set by far 
exceeds possible disadvantages associated with behavioral biases.    
d. Decomposition of anchoring test results 
Coming back to the question why the anchoring test produces so significant results, the high 
correlations of  ˆ
t Z  and  ˆ t e  may provide an answer. According to equations (4) to (6) we can 
decompose  the  anchoring  coefficient  ˆ γ   into  an  “inefficiency”  component  1 ˆ γ   and  an 
“additional  information”  component  2 ˆ γ .    Table  9  provides  statistics  on  1 ˆ γ   and  2 ˆ γ .  For 
comparison,  static  as  well  as  dynamic  γ -estimates  are  displayed  in  columns  1  and  2, 
respectively. Column 3 shows the approximated  ˆ γ  calculated on the basis of equation (4). In 
addition, columns 4 and 5 show the two components of  ˆ γ , i.e., the “inefficiency” component 
1 ˆ γ  and the “additional information” component  2 ˆ γ .  22 
 
The results clearly show that the additional information component  2 ˆ γ  is largely responsible 
for  a  substantial  part  of  the  overall  ˆ γ .  Considering  the  macroeconomic  series  with  a 
significantly  positive  anchoring  bias  coefficient,  we  find  that  in  11  out  of  16  cases  2 ˆ γ  
accounts for more than 50% of  ˆ γ . In two additional cases  2 ˆ γ  accounts for more than 25%.  
The theoretical decomposition analysis has already shown that the anchoring test can produce 
biased  results  due  to  the  “additional  information”  component  it  contains.
11  The  empirical 
results  now  show  that  this  “additional  information”  component  is  quite  large  for  most 
macroeconomic  series.  This  clearly  indicates  that  the  test  itself  includes  a  bias  which  is 
substantial.  
These findings also provide an explanation for the puzzling forecast improvement results. If 
the  anchoring  bias  test  does  not  solely  measure  a  cognitive  bias,  it  is  not  surprising  that 
controlling for such a bias cannot significantly change the quality of survey forecasts. 
IV.  Conclusion 
The anchoring bias test recently suggested by Campbell and Sharpe (2009) indicates that the 
survey forecasts for a broad range of US macroeconomic releases are severely biased. This 
irrationality implies that survey forecasts could be substantially improved when we control for 
the bias. Surprisingly, applying a dynamic test and adjustment procedure we find hardly any 
forecast  improvements.  Our  theoretical  analysis  explains  this  puzzling  empirical  result: 
Focusing  on  the  univariate  time-series  properties  of  announcements  the  anchoring  test 
neglects the possibility that analysts draw on a more comprehensive information set. Given 
the  univariate  setting  of  the  anchoring  test,  our  “horse  race”  of  survey  forecasts  against 
univariate time series model forecasts clearly shows that analysts have superior information 
                                                 
11 An adjustment based solely on  
1 γ leads to comparable results and is therefore not reported. 23 
 
processing abilities. Most likely, their outperformance is due to using a richer information set 
embracing  more  than  just  the  univariate  macroeconomic  series.  Obviously,  analysts  have 
access to a lot more information, for example, other related macroeconomic data or recent 
policy statements. We find that analysts use other macroeconomic information to generate 
their forecasts. Especially indicators released early in the month and those with much content 
about current and future economic activity are part of their information set.   
Our empirical decomposition of the estimated anchoring bias coefficients shows that analysts’ 
outperformance has a strong impact on the anchoring test. For the majority of significant 
anchoring tests, the “additional information” component explains more than half the size of 
the overall anchoring coefficient. This leads us to conclude that the anchoring test is highly 
misleading.  In  the  majority  of  cases  efficiency  –  not  inefficiency  –leads  to  the  statistical 
significant results.  
Given  the  strong  bias  in  the  test  and  the  weak  forecast  improvements  associated  with 
anchoring adjustments, the economical significance of anchoring in macroeconomic surveys 
is more than questionable. Overall, our results suggest that there is no reason to question the 
results of earlier studies using the MMS macroeconomic forecasts.  
An  intriguing  question  for  further  research  is  therefore  whether  and  to  what  extent 
macroeconomic analysts could outperform more sophisticated time series models. Naturally, a 
statistical model will never be able to capture the entire available information set. However, 
model based forecasts should be free of any cognitive bias. Yet, in order to obtain better 
forecasting models it is necessary to develop a better understanding of the factors driving the 
outperformance of analysts. While we cannot rule out with certainty that analysts’ forecasts 
may  contain  some  bias,  our  results  clearly  show  that  analysts’  forecasts  substantially 24 
 
outperform time series forecasts. Finally we have to conclude that survey forecasts provide 
the best available approximation of market participant’s expectations.  25 
 
Appendix A 
As stated the direct estimation of  
  ( ) 1 , t t h F E A A λ λ   = ⋅ + − ⋅     (8) 
is  not  possible.  However  the  estimation  becomes  feasible  by  means  of  the  well  known 
definition of the unanticipated news component of a macroeconomic release: 
  t t t S A F = − ,  (9) 
where  t S denotes the unanticipated news component called surprise,  t A  the actual announced 
value  of  the  macroeconomic  indicator  and  t F   the  survey  based  forecast.  Taking  the 
expectation of equation (9) and rearranging it leads to: 
  t t t E A F E S     = +      (10) 
Substituting  t E A     in (8) with (10) gives the model for the further investigation: 
  ( ) ( )
1




  = ⋅ −   .  (11) 
For reasons of clarity we define the slope coefficient in our model as: 




≡ .  (12) 
Therefore the regression model for the test of the anchoring bias is given by
12: 
  ( ) t t t h S F A γ η = ⋅ − + .  (13) 
 
   
                                                 
12 Although equation (13) does not include a constant we always include one in the estimation. 26 
 
Appendix B 
Assume that  t A  follows an ARMA(p,q) process without constant term, i.e.,  
1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 ... ... t t t p t p t t t q t q A b A b A b A e c e c e c e − − − − − − = ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅  
with i.i.d.  ( )
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Moreover suppose that analysts use a corresponding ARMA(p,q) model to generate forecasts. 
However, suppose that analysts can obtain some additional information  t Z  useful to predict 
the innovation  t e
 
in  t A , e.g., from the inspection of other macroeconomic announcements 
released earlier. Assume that  ( , ) 0 t t corr e Z ≠  and  ( , ) 0 1 t j t corr e Z j − = ∀ ≥ . Then their 
forecasts may be written as 
1
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t j t j t
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Substituting the above MA(∞) representations of the ARMA(1,1) processes of  t A  and  t F  into 
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Now, we can rewrite the anchoring bias regression as  
( )
' '
1 1 ˆ t t t t t t e y Z x Z
y x t t
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      ≡ ⋅ − + ⋅        ∑ ∑ ∑ . 
Note  that  '
1 t y − and  '
1 t x −   collect  past  time  series  information,  or  more  precisely,  terms 
depending on past innovations  t ε  and (true and estimated) time series parameters ( ˆ
j β and  
j β ). In contrast,  t ε  captures the innovations (or residuals) of the announcement process, i.e. 
the component of an announcement which is unpredictable on the basis of past time series 
information.   t Z is similar to a residual since it cannot be explained by past announcements. 28 
 
Hence  t Z  reflects deviations of analysts’ forecasts from purely time series based forecasts, 
or the influence of “other information” (besides past announcements) on analyst’ forecasts.  
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where the last line exploits the fact that  ( )
'
1 , 0 t t Cov Z y − =  by construction.  
We can split up this expression for the coefficient  ˆ γ into two parts by collecting all terms in 
the numerator depending on  '
1 t x −  and those depending on  t Z : 
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The first component  1 ˆ γ  captures the influence of (possibly biased) parameters  ˆ
j β , while the 
second component  2 ˆ γ  captures the influence of  t Z . 
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Table 1: Indicator Overview 
        Sample Period     
Indicator    Abbreviation    Start  End    Unit 
Business Inventories    BI    02/1988  10/2009    % change 
Consumer Confidence    CC    07/1991  12/2009    Level 
Consumer Price Index    CPI    01/1980  11/2009    % change 
Consumer Price Index ex Food& Energy     CPI ex    07/1989  11/2009    % change 
Construction Spending    CS    02/1988  10/2009    % change 
Durable Goods Orders    DGO    01/1980  11/2009    % change 
Nonfarm Payrolls    NFP    01/1985  11/2009    Change (Thousands) 
Civilian Unemployment Rate    UN    01/1980  11/2009    Level 
Hourly Earnings    HE    10/1989  11/2009    % change 
Factory Orders    FO    02/1988  10/2009    % change 
Housing Starts    HS    01/1980  11/2009    Level (Millions of Units) 
Industrial Production    IP    01/1980  11/2009    % change 
Capacity Utilization    CU    03/1988  11/2009    Level 
NAPM - renamed ISM Starting Aug. 2003    ISM    01/1990  11/2009    Level 
Index of Leading Indicators    LI    01/1980  11/2009    % change 
New Home Sales    NHS    02/1988  11/2009    Level (Thousands of Units) 
Personal Income    PI    01/1980  11/2009    % change 
Personal Consumption Expenditures    PCE    06/1985  11/2009    % change 
Producer Price Index    PPI    01/1980  11/2009    % change 
Producer Price Index ex Food& Energy    PPI ex    07/1989  11/2009    % change 
Retail Sales    RS    01/1980  11/2009    % change 
Retail Sales ex autos    RS ex    07/1989  11/2009    % change 
Goods and Service Trade Balance    TRD    01/1980  10/2009    Level ($ Billions) 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
    Actual  Forecast  Surprise 
Indicator  N      σ    
    σ    
    σ  
CC  222    95.595    27.533   95.476   26.779    0.119      5.212 
ISM  239    51.579     5.622   51.630    5.418   -0.051      2.022 
NF  299   106.080   200.982  115.080  157.507   -8.783    109.935 
UN  359     6.150     1.514    6.188    1.518   -0.019      0.164 
HE  240     0.273     0.205    0.261    0.064    0.011      0.195 
PPI  359     0.219     0.653    0.258    0.382   -0.039      0.399 
PPI ex  245     0.135     0.282    0.161    0.091   -0.026      0.265 
RS  359     0.305     1.136    0.324    0.749   -0.032      0.734 
RS ex  245     0.286     0.592    0.319    0.295   -0.033      0.445 
CPI  358     0.291     0.319    0.299    0.258   -0.010      0.151 
CPI ex  244     0.225     0.133    0.223    0.062    0.001      0.116 
IP  359     0.118     0.687    0.129    0.495   -0.010      0.331 
CU  261    80.203     3.586   80.190    3.579    0.006      0.370 
HS  359     1.473     0.349    1.461    0.338    0.012      0.098 
DGO  357     0.211     3.592    0.191    1.367    0.083      2.979 
NHS  261   799.123   244.938  792.236  234.279    6.887     61.263 
PI  358     0.456     0.443    0.407    0.304    0.051      0.304 
PCE  292     0.413     0.499    0.377    0.385    0.033      0.227 
LI  359     0.150     0.764    0.141    0.602    0.009      0.321 
CS  260     0.218     1.072    0.113    0.568    0.105      1.003 
FO  261     0.254     2.194    0.225    1.935    0.030      0.767 
BI  261     0.221     0.458    0.189    0.342    0.032      0.239 
TRD  358   -21.695    19.241     -21.524   19.291      -0.170      2.272 
This table reports the means (  ) and standard deviations (σ ) of the actual announced value (Actual), the MMS forecast (Forecast) and the 
resulting surprise calculated as the difference of Actual and Forecast.   33 
 
Table 3: Anchoring Bias Test Results 
  Static estimates    Dynamic estimates 
  h   ˆ γ     h   ˆ γ   ˆ γ  
Indicator        most frequent  mean  std.dev. 
CC  1   0.940
***       1    0.922  0.365   
ISM  1   0.297
**     2    0.225  0.284 
NF  2   0.070       3    0.137  0.271 
UN  2   0.054       1  -0.187  0.284 
HE  2   0.516
***    2    0.439  0.264 
PPI  3   0.315
***    3    0.303  0.146 
PPI ex  1   0.205
**     2    0.176  0.262 
RS  1   0.166
***    1    0.183  0.114 
RS ex  1   0.275
***    1    0.382  0.217 
CPI  3   0.150
***    3    0.130  0.127 
CPI ex  1  -0.214
**     1  -0.149  0.175 
IP  3   0.256
***    2    0.204  0.173 
CU  1   0.319
***    1    0.268  0.122 
HS  1   0.281
**     1    0.339  0.153 
DGO  3   0.398
***    2    0.350  0.103 
NHS  3  -0.104       1    0.557  0.228 
PI  2   0.094       3    0.153  0.115 
PCE  2   0.189
***    2    0.250  0.098 
LI  3   0.174
***    3    0.150  0.107 
CS  3  -0.222
***    1  -0.247  0.087 
FO  3   0.040
**     1    0.036  0.033 
BI  3   0.197
***    2    0.260  0.108 
TRD  3  -0.014       1    0.267  0.210 
This table reports results of anchoring bias estimates according to  
  ( ) t t t h S F A γ ε = ⋅ − + , 
where  t S  denotes surprises, i.e. actual values( t A ) minus MMS forecast ( t F ), and  h A  is the 
h  month anchor (i.e. the mean of the h  previously released actuals). The first two columns 
report the optimal h   and estimated  ˆ γ  for a test performed on the full sample.  Columns (3) 
to  (5)  report  the  results  for  rolling  window  regressions  with  a  fixed  length  of  10  years. 
Inference is based on White Standard Errors. 
*, 
**, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively. 
   34 
 
 
Table 4: Impact of Anchoring Adjustments on Forecast Quality  
 
 
    Static adjustment    Dynamic adjustment 
Indicator 
Static 
ˆ γ       RMSFE  Diebold 
Mariano      RMSFE  Diebold 
Mariano 
CC      0.940
***    -8.38%  3.0611
***   -7.94%    2.3913
** 
ISM      0.297
**     -1.14%  1.1600       3.36%   -1.4817   
NF      0.070       -0.15%  0.3318       3.47%   -2.0611
** 
UN      0.054       -0.36%  1.0481       1.06%   -1.1930   
HE      0.516
***    -6.09%  1.9677
*     -2.11%     0.3788   
PPI      0.315
***    -6.81%  2.2901
**    -4.63%     1.5963   
PPI ex      0.205
**     -2.44%  1.0270      -1.98%     0.7873   
RS      0.166
***    -5.73%  2.2316
**    15.41%   -0.9479   
RS ex      0.275
***    -6.39%  2.2695
**    -7.87%     1.5492   
CPI      0.150
***    -2.58%  1.7648
*     -2.21%     1.0900   
CPI ex    -0.214
**     -2.42%  1.5437      -0.12%     0.0846   
IP      0.256
***    -6.01%  1.7234
*     -4.82%     1.0857   
CU      0.319
***    -3.65%  1.7317
*     -3.24%     1.3350   
HS      0.281
**     -1.02%  0.9885       1.22%   -1.0694   
DGO      0.398
***    -4.56%  3.2828
***   -5.71%     2.5341
** 
NHS    -0.104       -0.33%  0.9153       1.36%   -0.8149   
PI      0.094       -0.53%  0.9634       0.56%   -0.7182   
PCE      0.189
***    -6.95%  1.8066
*     -1.09%     0.2461   
LI      0.174
***    -6.75%  1.0762      -1.56%     0.8598   
CS    -0.222
***    -1.90%  2.0148
**    -2.21%     1.3186   
FO      0.040
**     -0.70%  0.9962       0.12%   -0.0589   
BI      0.197
***    -1.40%  1.2159      -1.87%     1.2158   
TRD    -0.014       -0.00%  0.1045       3.91%   -1.9588
*  
This table reports adjustments survey forecasts according to the estimated anchoring bias 
( ) ˆ ˆ 1 adj
t t h F F A γ γ = + ⋅ − ⋅ , 
where  t F  denotes MMS forecast ( t F ) and  h A  is the h  months anchor (i.e. the mean of the 
h  previously released actuals). For convenience, column (1) redisplays static estimates of   ˆ γ
. Columns (2)-(5) report the results of a Diebold-Mariano test with small sample adjustment 
for the equality of mean squared errors (MSE). H0: MSE of  t F
adj = MSE of  t F . Inference of 
ˆ γ  is based on White standard errors. 
*, 
**, 
*** indicates significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% 
level, respectively. 
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  CC  1,0,0    6.48    5.20  -19.7%  -5.46
*** 
  ISM  0,1,0    2.38    2.06  -13.5%  -3.71
*** 
  NF  1,0,1  136.71  109.97  -19.6%  -4.17
*** 
  UN  2,0,1    0.21    0.17  -15.3%  -2.84
*** 
  HE  3,1,1    0.15    0.13  -10.8%  -1.87
*   
  PPI  1,1,1    0.72    0.43  -39.6%  -2.88
*** 
  PPI ex  0,1,1    2.10    0.29  -86.2%  -1.04    
  RS  2,1,1    1.15    0.73  -36.8%  -3.14
*** 
  RS ex  0,1,1    0.96    0.53  -45.0%  -2.25
**  
  CPI  1,1,1    0.26    0.13  -49.3%  -3.33
*** 
  CPI ex  0,1,1    0.31    0.10  -68.3%  -1.89
*   
  IP  0,1,1    0.63    0.33  -47.2%  -4.77
*** 
  CU  1,0,0    0.56    0.40  -28.4%  -4.18
*** 
  HS  2,0,0    1.71    0.08  -95.2%  -1.54    
  DGO  2,1,1    3.12    2.81  -9.8%   -2.50
**  
  NHS  1,0,1   74.11   67.98  -8.3%   -1.87
*   
  PI  0,1,1    0.46    0.31  -32.7%  -3.30
*** 
  PCE  2,1,1    0.43    0.20  -52.7%  -2.78
*** 
  LI  0,1,1    0.46    0.19  -59.3%  -4.57
*** 
  CS  0,1,1    1.22    0.91  -25.4%  -1.52    
  FO  2,1,1    2.29    0.74  -67.5%  -2.97
*** 
  BI  0,1,1    0.37    0.25  -32.7%  -3.75
*** 
  TRD  1,0,1    2.93    2.46  -16.2%  -3.01
*** 
In column (1) this table reports the most frequent ARIMA specification from the rolling 
estimation procedure. Column (2) and (3) report the root mean squared forecast errors 
(RMSFE) of the time series forecasts and the original MMS data. Column (4) shows the 
percentage difference of the RMSFE, where negative values indicate the superiority of 
the MMS data. In column (5) contains the results of a modified Diebold- Mariano test for 
MSE equality (H0:MSE




*** indicates significance at the 




   36 
 
Table 6: Residual Correlations 
 
Indicator    ( ) t Var ε          
  ( ) t Var Z       Correlation( , ) t t Z ε     
CC  41.73  5.06  0.68
*** 
ISM  5.31  0.92  0.50
*** 
NF  19000.00  5182.06  0.60
*** 
UN  0.04  0.01  0.52
*** 
HE  0.04  0.00  0.32
*** 
PPI  0.40  0.12  0.82
*** 
PPI ex  0.08  0.01  0.36
*** 
RS  1.16  0.55  0.77
*** 
RS ex  0.35  0.09  0.69
*** 
CPI  0.07  0.04  0.81
*** 
CPI ex  0.01  0.00  0.24
*** 
IP  0.39  0.17  0.86
*** 
CU  0.28  0.08  0.74
*** 
HS  0.01  0.00  0.57
*** 
DGO  10.79  1.40  0.50
*** 
NHS  4396.60  447.31  0.41
*** 
PI  0.18  0.08  0.71
*** 
PCE  0.22  0.14  0.89
*** 
LI  0.50  0.29  0.90
*** 
CS  1.10  0.32  0.37
*** 
FO  4.16  3.15  0.93
*** 
BI  0.12  0.04  0.77
*** 
TRD  6.69  1.30  0.53
*** 
This table reports the variances of the innovation in announcements  ˆ t ε  and the 
approximated additional information component in survey forecasts  ˆ
t Z  which we 
retrieved from optimally fitted distributed lag models as described in section 1. In 
addition the correlation of ˆ t ε  and  ˆ
t Z  is provided. 
***, 
,** , and 
* denotes significance 
of these correlations at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 7: Additional Information Content for Selected Indicators 
Indicator  CC  DGO  IP  NFP  PPI ex  RS ex 
HS  -0.004**  0.762***  0.001* 
PPI  0.064***  0.013**  2.668***  0.013*** 
UN  0.001**  0.001***  0.000*** 
PCE  0.749***  0.213***  -0.098**  26.725***  0.042*** 
CU  0.373*** 
HE  -0.309*  0.186*  -0.108*** 
NHS  -0.122** 
RS  0.108**  7.890* 
TRD 
LI  0.306***  0.023*  0.197** 
BI  0.786*  82.475***  0.195*** 
CC  0.647*** 
ISM  -0.051***  0.017*** 
CS  1.124* 
CPI ex  -0.035** 
IP  -0.000*  0.059*** 
PI  0.017** 
PPI ex  31.745** 
CPI 
FO  0.109**  0.040**  10.280**  0.010** 
NFP  -0.162***  0.073*** 
DGO  -0.067** 
RS ex  -0.001*** 
This  table  report  the  regression  results  of  the  additional  information  on  available 
macroeconomic information seven days prior to the next announcement: 
, t t t Z M α β ϕ = + +   
where  t Z  denotes the approximated additional information component in survey forecasts and 
t M a vector containing the available macroeconomic information set for the 23 considered 
indicators seven days prior to an announcement. A stepwise regression approach was used to 
obtain  the  models.  *,  **,  ***  indicates  significance  at  the  10%,  5%  and  1%  level, 
respectively. 
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Table 8: Additional Information Content R-squared and Indicator Frequency 
Indicator  # of variables in Mt  R
2  Frequency of indicator in Mt 
CC  3  0.121  10 
ISM  10  0.213  14 
NF  8  0.312  11 
UN  6  0.132  14 
HE  6  0.391  5 
PPI  3  0.084  9 
PPI ex  7  0.395  6 
RS  6  0.241  8 
RS ex  8  0.439  3 
CPI  2  0.070  6 
CPI ex  6  0.239  4 
IP  10  0.399  7 
CU  10  0.302  11 
HS  9  0.390  4 
DGO  9  0.525  5 
NHS  7  0.319  12 
PI  8  0.429  3 
PCE  7  0.808  6 
LI  7  0.190  3 
CS  6  0.572  7 
FO  8  0.768  6 
BI  11  0.381  6 
TRD  9  0.513  6 
Min  0.070 
Max  0.808 
Mean  0.358 
Median  0.381 
This  table  reports  the  number  of  explanatory  variables  in  the  vector  of  available 
macroeconomic information  t M  in the regression  , t t t Z M α β ϕ = + + , the associated R-
squared and the frequency of each indicator in  t M , i.e. in how many cases the respective 
indicator contributes to the explanation of  t Z .  
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Table 9: Gamma Decomposition 
 
 
  Test results    Model based approximation 
Indicator   
Static      
estimates     
ˆ γ      
Dynamic 
estimates  
mean  ˆ γ    
total 
ˆ γ    
inefficiency 
component 
1 ˆ γ  
add. information 
component 
2 ˆ γ  
CC      0.940
***   0.922    0.940   -0.000  0.940 
ISM      0.297
**    0.225    0.297    0.118  0.179 
NF      0.070      0.137    0.070   -0.028  0.098 
UN      0.054     -0.187    0.049    0.031  0.018 
HE      0.516
***   0.439    0.516    0.486  0.030 
PPI      0.315
***   0.303    0.311   -0.003  0.314 
PPI ex      0.205
**    0.176    0.205    0.201  0.005 
RS      0.166
***   0.183    0.166    0.136  0.030 
RS ex      0.275
***   0.382    0.275    0.033  0.242 
CPI      0.150
***   0.130    0.149    0.060  0.090 
CPI ex     -0.214
**   -0.149    -0.214   -0.158  -0.056 
IP      0.256
***   0.204    0.254   -0.244  0.498 
CU      0.319
***   0.268    0.320    0.035  0.285 
HS      0.281
**    0.339    0.280    0.072  0.208 
DGO      0.398
***   0.350    0.399    0.225  0.174 
NHS     -0.104      0.557    -0.102   -0.211  0.108 
PI      0.094      0.153    0.095    0.053  0.041 
PCE      0.189
***   0.250    0.189    0.127  0.062 
LI      0.174
***   0.150    0.178    0.026  0.152 
CS     -0.222
***  -0.247    -0.217   -0.139  -0.078 
FI      0.040
**    0.036    0.040   -0.002  0.042 
BI      0.197
***   0.260    0.197   -0.036  0.233 
TRD     -0.014      0.267    -0.016   -0.122  0.106 
This table reports results of anchoring bias estimations: 
( ) t t t h S F A γ ε = ⋅ − + ,
 
where  t S  denotes surprises, i.e. actual values ( t A ) minus MMS forecast ( t F ), and  h A  is the  
h  months anchor (i.e. the mean of the h  previously released actuals). Column (1) contains 
the coefficients from the static test setting; column (2) reports the mean coefficients from the 
rolling estimation. Column (3) to (5) show the corresponding approximations of  ˆ γ  and its 
decomposition into an  “inefficiency” ( 1 ˆ γ ) and an “additional information” ( 2 ˆ γ ) component:  
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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